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Abstract 
We examine the economic performance of Oman’s economy over the period from 1998 to 2016, 
where data are readily available. Our focus is on the performance of the non-hydrocarbon sector 
(NHC sector) relative to the hydrocarbon sector (HC sector), nominal versus real GDP growth, 
productivity measures, the drivers of growth, and the return to investments. We also compare 
Oman non-hydrocarbon sector performance to Dubai, which is the closet non-oil economy. We 
have a number of finding that could help policymakers.      
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1. Introduction 
 
The sole interest in Oman stems from that fact that it was the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
oil-producing country most adversely affected by the negative oil price shock in 2014. Oman is a 
relatively small GCC producer of crude. It produces less than one million barrel a day. However, 
most of the government revenues come from oil income. Figure (1) plots the share of oil 
revenues in total revenues; the average from 1986 to 2017 is 70 percent. The dip in revenues in 
2014 was due to the oil price shock in March 2014. Most interestingly, to finance the budget 
deficit, the government decided to borrow in the international capital market, at increasing costs, 
instead of asking the IMF for assistants. Fiscal adjustment and economic recovery have been 
underway since 2014, incomplete, and there is evidence that it might take more time. 
 
Figure (2) plots the external debt to GDP ratio. The ratio spiked in 2014. Since 2014 and the 
Omani government has been trying to make fiscal adjustments. Although the IMF Article IV 
2019 sounds optimistic, the economic condition remains critical especially with the COVID-19 
pandemic that engulfed the world in 2020. Figure (3) plots the primary fiscal balance. It took a 
significant dip in 2014, and it indicates that expenditures have been stubbornly high.   
 
We have a number of objectives. First, we examine the relationship between the non-
hydrocarbon sector (NHC) and the hydrocarbon sector (HC), both for real GDP and real GDP 
per person (i.e., a measure of productivity). The main question is whether Oman can progress 
without too much reliance on oil, which depends on the progress of the NHC sector. Second, we 
do a growth accounting to assess the drivers of productivity growth. Third, we compare the 
NHC’s productivity with Dubai’s, which is the closest non-hydrocarbon economy. Fourth, we 
estimate the rate of return to private investments. 
 
Our main findings are that, first, the share of the NHC sector increased from about 40 percent of 
the total economy over the period from 1998 to 2005, to a nearly 60 percent over the period 2006 
to 2016. This is a good progress. It implies that Oman has been increasingly diversifying income 
away from oil. Second, consistent with the increase in the share of the NHC sector in the 
economy, real GDP growth in the NHC sector has been notable over the period 1998 to 2006.  
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It grew at an average of 6.8 percent, while the whole economy's average growth rate was 3.6 
percent, and the HC sector grew by less than 1 percent. Third, the NHC sector has been relatively 
less volatile because domestic prices are usually less volatile compared with oil prices, which is 
highly likely due to subsidies of locally produced goods and services. All these findings are 
encouraging signs for the future of Oman. Fourth, there is a general belief among Omanis that 
the NHC sector is driven by oil income. This is not true; it cannot be confirmed by the data. 
While nominal GDP growth rates across sectors are correlated, the real GDP growth in the NHC 
sector is independent from growth in the HC sector. This nominal-real distinction is important.  
 
Fifth, strong real GDP growth notwithstanding, productivity growth, i.e., real GDP per person, 
has been negative on average. The average productivity growth rates are -3.27, -6.45, and -0.08 
percent for the economy as a whole, the HC sector, and the NHC sector respectively. Sixth, 
capital productivity growth in the NHC sector has been rising; however, it has been declining in 
the HC sector and nearly flat in the economy. It means that more investments had taken place 
over time. Labor productivity and Total Factor Productivity (TFP), in levels and in growth rates, 
have been disappointing. Labor productivity has been falling. Our estimated marginal 
productivity of labor has been declining in all sectors. There is a caveat, however, with respect to 
measurements. Services output is the largest in the NHC sector. It comprises 35 percent. Services 
output is hard to measure and usually measured with large errors, thus productivity is measured 
with errors too. Furthermore, because most of the skilled Omanis work in the government, 128 
thousand, their output is not measurable. Thus, we have missing productivity.  
 
Seventh, growth accounting reveals that only capital deepening (capital – output ratio growth) 
and TFP growth in the HC sector could account for some of the growth in real GDP per person. 
Neither labor nor human capital is significant. Eighth, there is a high positive real GDP growth 
income and a negative real GDP per person growth, i.e., productivity. The increase in GDP is a 
result of higher oil price, a positive terms of trade shock. Productivity is unaffected by the price 
oil but by investments in R&D, usable knowledge, education and human capital, TFP, and global 
research efforts, e.g. Kuznets (1960), Romer (1990), Jones (2002), Lucas (2009). Real GDP 
growth and real GDP per person are measures of two different things.  
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Ninth, comparing Oman's NHC sector's productivity to Dubai's, which is the closest NHC 
economy, suggests that Dubai's productivity growth has been relatively poor. Dubai’s real GDP 
per capita growth rate over the period from 2007 to 2016 was -1.0 percent; nevertheless, it is 
higher than Oman's NHC sector. Dubai’s economy is dominated by services. Services sector 
makes up nearly 70 percent of the total economy. Note that the service sector’s output such as 
the output of education, health, defense, administration, and other services, is difficult to 
measure. Therefore, productivity measures are highly uncertain.  
 
Tenth, for the economy as a whole, real GDP per capita growth is negatively correlated with 
government expenditures and investments, positively correlated with private investments and the 
production of hydrocarbon (oil and gas). For the NHC sector, private investment is a key driver 
of productivity growth. Government investments and oil production have no effect on real GDP 
per person growth rate. Everything else remains unchanged; a 10 percent increase in private 
investments to GDP ratio increases real GDP per capita growth rate by a quarter of a percentage 
point.  
 
We estimate that the total private investment in the projects of the Development Plan, which is 
OR 8.5 billion so far (double the private investments level in 2016 OR 4,300.67 million) would 
increase real GDP by OR 1,15 million annually. Hydrocarbon production (oil and gas in 
equivalent millions of barrels of oil) has a very significant impact on real GDP per person growth 
rate in Oman. Depending on specifications, a 10 percent increase in the growth rate of the 
production of oil and gas per person increase real GDP growth by 6 percent. However, the effect 
of oil production on real GDP growth in the NHC sector is insignificant.  
 
Eleventh, Oman main weakness is low productivity.  This is true, however, for all GCC 
countries, and all Arab countries. To be precise, labor productivity is poor because the quality of 
labor is poor. We do not have adequate measures of labor quality; however, a closer look at the 
data shows that Oman's labor is largely unskilled. There are 1.8 million unskilled workers in the 
NHC sector. Among this labor, there are 1.6 million unskilled foreign workers with less than 
secondary school qualification. Even if we ignore domestic and construction workers, we still 
have a relatively large unskilled labor in the NHC sector. Occupation wise, there are only 
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450,485 skilled laborers working in the private sector. They make 22 percent of total 
employment in the sector. Unskilled expats make about 70 percent of the total number of 
workers in the private sector. This large number of unskilled labor reduces overall labor 
productivity in the NHC sector. 
  
Twelve, on the other hand, most of the skilled Omanis workers work in the government. 
Unfortunately, their productivities (output/inputs) are immeasurable because their output is 
immeasurable because we do not have a measure of their outputs. Thirteenth, according to the 
World Bank recent special report on the education outcomes in Oman, there is evidence that 
primary and secondary school attainments are low and education outcomes are poor (e.g., low 
level of learning). We extrapolate that these outcomes adversely affect the skill level. Dubai’s 
education outcomes are much higher than Oman. We found that proxies for human capital such 
as the growth rates of schools and university enrollments have insignificant effect on real GDP 
per capita growth.  
 
In summary, Oman’s NHC sector suffers from an excess supply of unskilled labor, which seems 
to be the main cause of low productivity. Because of the excess supply of unskilled labor, the 
NHC goods and services market in Oman is limited to producing unskilled-intensive goods with 
low returns. Technical progress and investments are the drivers of productivity growth. 
Investments, domestic and FDI seek returns. If productivity is low, investments remain low. In 
addition, technical progress requires skilled labor, hence skill-biased technical change. To 
achieve such changes, the labor market conditions must be corrected.  
 
There are two general types of relevant policies to deal with the problems of excess supply of 
unskilled labor; fiscal policy and activist labor market Policies. Usually, in market economies, 
fiscal policy influences wages, productivity and employment via changes in the tax rates on 
individuals and corporations. Tax on labor income could, for example, be used to close the gap 
between the public and private real wages and induce changes in the distribution of labor and 
skills across sectors. For example, the introduction of a labor income tax, or increasing the tax 
rate on labor income in the public sector could motivate the Omani skilled labor to take jobs in 
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the private sector. Without such tax, the government could effectively motivate skilled Omani 
labor to move from the public sector to the private sector because people respond to incentives.  
 
The fiscal authority could use the available corporate tax as a policy instrument to affect 
employment or productivity in the private sector. For example, the fiscal authority could give 
incentives to businesses to increase the share of Omanis by either lowering business taxes or 
given them tax credit. It could do the same to increase FDI or R&D, or productivity.    
 
More taxes mean, and to a certain extent, more revenues. Some argue that taxes could reduce or 
even eliminate the budget deficit, unless the Laffer curve is true, which means taxable income 
declines with higher tax rates. However, the tax carries with it the usual trade-offs, which must 
be considered carefully. There is a very large literature on the political economy of taxation. 
“Taxation and representation” and whether taxes lead to more democracy are typical questions 
asked in this literature. There is no solid evidence that taxation leads to democracy. There is, 
however, a concern that taxation could lead to social unrest. The timing matters.  
 
From a macroeconomic viewpoint, the introduction of labor income tax reduces the supply of 
labor, productivity, and real after-tax wages. Finally, there is the timing of introducing taxes. 
Taxes should not be increased or introduced when the economy is in a downturn. Oman’s 
economy is on the downturn of the business cycle so increasing taxes is not a good idea. 
Developed countries do not increase taxes during recessions. 
 
To increase productivity, the labor market skilled-unskilled imbalances must be fixed first. 
Flexible labor market conditions increase private investments. Private investments require 
markets with free entry, reasonable regulations, and a suitable business environment. There are 
two other important markets in addition to the labor market, which affect private savings-
investments-productivity growth: the goods and services market, and the money-credit market.  
 
The money-credit market mobilizes and manages domestic savings and promotes private 
investments. Interest rate liberalization is a key structural financial reform. The theoretical 
argument under the assumptions of perfect information and competition calls for letting the 
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market to determine the allocation of credit.  With the real interest rate adjusting to its 
equilibrium level, low-yield investment projects would be eliminated so that the overall 
efficiency of investment increases.  As the real interest rate increases, saving rates and the total 
supply of credit increase, which induce more investments.  Investments increase the steady-state 
rate of economic growth. It is unclear that the lending rate is market-determined in Oman and 
how the Central Bank of Oman affects it. The gap between deposit rate and lending rate is very 
wide.  
 
Over a very long span of time, skills growth motivates more technically advanced capital 
investments. It also motivates high quality FDI.i Finally, domestic investors and domestic 
businesses entry to market face a structural competitiveness issue. Oman is a mercantile 
economy similar to all GCC countries with a few dominant conglomerates, which have exclusive 
import licenses. Therefore, entry of new businesses and investors, regardless of their size, is 
difficult. It is quite clear that this problem requires the intervention of the highest authority in the 
land.     
  
We have seven sections in this paper. In the next section, we present some stylized facts. Section 
3 analyzes productivity, growth accounting. Section 3 analyzes productivity. Section 4 explains 
why labor productivity is low. Section 5 is a comparison with Dubai.  Section 6 provides 
measures of the rate of return on private investments, and the last section is a conclusion.  
 
The data are from the Omani National Center of Statistics and Information, the Ministry of 
Finance, and the IMF World Economic Outlook. Dubai’s data are from the website of Dubai 
official statistics. The data are available from 1998-2016. Some data are available in longer time 
series, but others are shorter. Usually, the GDP and most real variables are difficult to find up to 
date. GDP is published with a lag of two years. 
     
2. Stylized Facts  
 
The NHC sector is important for the future of Oman’s objective to diversify income away from 
oil. Table (1) lists the average contributions of sub-sectors in the NHC sector in Oman over the 
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period 1998-2016.  Services dominate the NHC; they make up 35 percent of the real economy, 
followed by manufacturing with 14 percent.  
 
We plot the real (constant base price) GDP growth rates for the economy, the HC and the NHC 
sectors in Figure (4). The data suggest a number of interesting stylized facts. First, contrary to 
common beliefs, on average, the real GDP growth rate of the NHC sector is higher (6.8 percent) 
than that of the HC sector (0.91 percent) and the economy-wide growth rate (3.61 percent). 
Furthermore, the share of the oil sector in the economy has been declining and the share of the 
NHC sector increasing. Table (2) reports the averages over the two sub-samples, 1998-2005 and 
2006-2016. The size of the NHC sector has increased significantly over time while the HC sector 
shrunk. Second, growth in the NHC sector has been relatively less volatile than the other two. 
The coefficient of variation is 0.51 compared with 4.9 for the HC sector and 0.84 for the 
economy, see table (3). Oil is inherently volatile market. Third, the growth rates equalize at the 
end of the sample. Fourth, the correlation between the economy-wide and the HC sector real 
GDP growth rates is high, 0.80. The correlation between the economy-wide and the NHC sector 
growth rates is much smaller, 0.50. However, most interestingly, the correlation between the HC 
and the NHC over the sample is -0.10. Negative correlation implies that the HC sector’s growth 
does not induce growth in the NHC sector. Precisely, the two sectors are statistically 
independent. The chi-squared test for independence has a value of zero (P-value equal 1).ii 
Figure (5) is a scatter plot of the two variables. Again, the plot shows that there is no correlation 
or causation along the 45  line. Table (3) reports descriptive statistics. 
   
2.1 Explaining real growth-stylized facts     
 
The results presented above point out to an important distinction between nominal and real 
quantities. Some policymakers in Oman ignore this distinction. They believe that oil drives up 
the NHC sector. Figure (6) plots the growth rate of nominal (current producer price) GDP for the 
Omani economy, HC and NHC sectors. The picture is consistent with the abovementioned belief 
and very different from figure (4). The correlation between the growth rate of nominal GDP of 
the economy and that of the HC sector is 0.99; between the HC and NHC sectors is 0.50; and 
between the economy and the NHC sector is 0.70.  These are significantly different rates from 
   
 
9 
 
the correlations in real terms, which we reported earlier, -0.10 and 0.50 represent a significant 
difference. Second, the NHC sector nominal GDP growth has been the least volatile with the 
coefficients of variation 0.70 compared with 3.7 for the HC sector and 1.7 for the economy. On 
average over the sample from 1999 to 2016, the NHC sector nominal GDP growth rate was 9.33 
percent compared with the growth rate of the whole economy, which is 8.9 percent, and the HC 
sector, which was 7.8 percent.  
 
Figures (4), (5), and (6) suggest that at least one potential explanation for the relatively better 
performance of the NHC sector is that the price deflator of the NHC sector is, on average, 
significantly smaller and less volatile than prices in the oil sector and the whole economy. Table 
(4) confirms this suggestion. It reports the averages, the standard deviations, and the coefficients 
of variation for the inflation rate in these three sectors. The NHC sector’s price deflator is, on 
average, the lowest and the least volatile. Domestic prices in the NHC sector, unlike the price of 
oil, which behaves like as asset prices and subject to volatile shocks, could be stickier. The 
sickness of domestic prices of goods and services could be a result of subsidies and regulations 
among other reasons. Price subsidies and other regulations among other reasons could explain 
price stickiness.   
 
In the case of a demand shock, for example, an upward shift in the demand curve causes a larger 
change in output and a smaller change in prices. Sketch (1) illustrates the point. Assume that the 
supply curve      is flatter in the NHC sector with sticky price than the HC sector supply curve    . The demand is downward slopping   . Output is   and the prices in the HC and NHC 
sectors are the same     and      respectively. A shift in the demand curve to   changes the 
output from   to           while the price in the NHC sector remains at      and the price in 
HC sector increases to     .  Essentially, NHC sector’s output increases by more than the HC 
sector and the price remains unchanged. In real terms, output in the NHC sector is greater. The 
same happens if we use output growth and price changes.  
 
More on this point is that the standard deviation of inflation by sectors (except for fisheries) is 
significantly higher in the HC sectors and the industries where hydrocarbon is an input in the 
production. Figure (7) plots the statistics.  
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Sketch (1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Productivity 
 
Examining real GDP per person growth (i.e., productivity growth) paints a significantly different 
picture for Oman than real GDP growth. Over the same sample from 1999 to 2016, average 
Oman’s real GDP per person growth rate is -3.27 percent. The growth rates for the NHC and HC 
sectors are -0.08 and -6.45 percent respectively. These negative productivity growth rates, unlike 
real GDP growth, are the main problem of the Omani economy.iii   
 
Figure (8) is a scatter plot of the growth rate of the real GDP per employed person in the 
economy (e.g., another proxy for productivity growth) and growth rates of the real GDP per 
employed person in the NHC sector and the HC sector for the period 1999 to 2006. First, most of 
the scatter dots are in the negative quadrant of the graph. Second, the NHC sector’s labor 
productivity growth has higher correlation coefficient with the economy-wide growth per person, 
(0.89) compared with (0.12) for the HC sector – scatter plots closeness around the 45  line 
indicates higher association between sector’s productivity and the economy-wide productivity 
growth. Figure (9) plots the times series data. The NHC sector has a much higher productivity 
growth throughout the sample. 
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3.1 Marginal Productivity  
 
We calibrate a constant return to scale Cobb-Douglas production function.iv An index for the 
marginal productivity of labor (i.e., the change in output resulting from increasing labor by one 
extra unit) is plotted in figure (10).  The marginal productivity of labor has been falling 
everywhere, but its level is higher in the NHC sector than in the HC sector and the economy-
wide measure as well. Declining marginal productivity has something to do with the large 
number of unskilled labor in Oman, which we will examine further in the next sections.  
 
Figure (11) plots the marginal productivity of capital. For the economy-wide, it is generally more 
volatile and falling. It is falling in the HC sector, but rising in the NHC sector. Thus adding more 
capital to the production of goods and services in the NHC sector has been driving up 
productivity. Later, we will examine the effect of private investments on real GDP per person 
growth rate.  
 
3.2 Total Factor Productivity (TFP) 
 
We measure TFP it by calibrating the same Cobb-Douglas production function described 
earlier.v TFP is a measure of efficiency. The results are consistent with real GDP per person in 
the sense that the NHC sector’s performance is better than the HC and the rest of the economy; 
although, TFP deteriorated over time in all sectors.  Figure (12) plots the level of TFP index.vi 
Figure (13) plots the growth rates of TFP. Table (5) reports average statistics. Average TFP 
growth rates are negative. The Conference Board also reports negative TFP growth for Oman 
over a long period.   
 
Both the level and the growth rate of TFP in the NHC sector lie above those of the whole 
economy and the HC sector. The average growth rates for the economy, the HC and NHC 
sectors are negative as shown in the table above. The NHC sector’s TFP growth, although 
negative, it is higher than TFP growth of the economy. However, it is highly volatile. The 
volatility in the NHC sector is twice as large as the volatility in the HC sector and nearly three 
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times larger than the economy-wide TFP growth volatility. The volatility is an indicator of 
heightened uncertainty. 
Next, we examine growth accounting for the association of: capital deepening; labor; human 
capital; and TFP growth rates with real GDP per person growth in all sectors.  
 
3.3 Growth Accounting 
 
3.3.1 Capital Deepening 
 
Figure (14) plots the effect of capital deepening measured by the growth rate of capital – output 
ratio and the economy’s productivity growth. The 45  line measures the goodness of fit, whereby 
scatter plots closely around the line from both sides represent good fit. Domestic capital is 
savings. Investment is the rate of change of capital after accounting for some depreciation of the 
stock of capital. Investment is a very important determinant of economic growth. However, a 
significant amount of the capital stock is also imported. Unlike the HC sector, the NHC sector’s 
capital deepening has a significant effect on the overall productivity of the economy. The HC 
sector’s capital deepening (triangles) does not seem to explain the economy-wide productivity 
growth as much as the NHC sector’s. Nonetheless, capital growth seems to explain more of the 
variations of the real GDP per capita growth in Oman.  
 
3.3.2 Labor 
 
Figure (15) plots the employment growth data. Unlike capital, employment does not explain the 
variations in the economy’s real GDP per person. Most of the scatter plots are far away from the 
45  line.  
 
3.3.3 Human Capitalvii  
 
Figure (16) plots the proxies of human capital growth. Human capital accumulation increases 
skills and enables the labor force in the process of the absorption and the adoption of global 
knowledge. This enhances the efficiency of technological diffusion and subsequent economic 
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growth.viii  We use primary and secondary school enrollments and college and university 
enrollments growth rates as proxies for human capital. These data are only available for the 
whole economy. Sectoral data are unavailable. Primary and secondary enrollment explains more 
of Oman’s productivity growth than college and university enrollment, however, the overall fit is 
weak for both proxies. The scatter plots are far from the 45  line. These weak associations are 
consistent with the employment growth data. Labor and skills seem to have very little or no 
effect on overall productivity growth in Oman. Labor quality is the Achilles Heel of the Omani 
economy. We will provide more evidence later in this analysis. 
 
3.3.4 TFP 
 
Finally, we plot TFP growth against the economy-wide productivity growth in figure (17). There 
is close association between TFP growth in the HC sector in particular and the economy-wide 
productivity growth with the exception of 2003. TFP, which is generated by global research 
efforts, is transferred to Oman via, for example, imported capital, global management, 
accounting practices, and technology. We showed earlier that the marginal productivity of capital 
has been increasing in the NHC sector. Capital goods are imported into Oman, and with these 
imported capital goods, Oman gets its share of global growth in knowledge, which eventually 
drive GDP growth per person.ix There must be a significant amount of knowledge transfer 
through capital imports in the HC sector for as long as the oil industry has been operating in 
Oman. 
 
4. Why Labor Productivity is low? 
 
Having illustrated that labor productivity and labor productivity growth are relatively low, and 
that labor does not explain real GDP per capita growth, we need to understand why that is. Table 
(6) reports the distribution of labor in Oman by skills. It is plainly clear that Oman’s labor market 
is dominated by unskilled labor and that is the main reason for low labor productivity.  
First, the number of unskilled workers defined by those who have secondary degree and less is 
more than 1.8 million workers. This is 90 percent of the total employment in the private sector. 
Among those, there are 1.6 million unskilled ex-pats. Adding more unskilled labor to the 
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production of GDP would not increase productivity, or only increase the production of unskilled-
intensive goods, but most likely services. Recall that services output is hard to measure.  
 
Second, most of the highly skilled Omanis work in the public sector, about 75 percent of total 
Omani workers. Skilled Omanis in government do not add to labor productivity since the 
government is not a producer of goods and services. These figures explain the low productivity 
statistics satisfactorily.  
 
Third, the larger the share of services, e.g., education, health, administration, and defense, the 
less certain we are about labor productivity because output of these sectors is difficult to 
measure.  
 
Fourth, the rate of growth of employment is higher than the rate of growth real GDP; the 
difference, which is real GDP per person growth is negative. The increase in employment growth 
is explained by the average low wage rates of the unskilled labor in the private sector. For 
example, in 2016 the growth rate of real GDP in the NHC sector was 1.8 percent while 
employment grew at 8.37 percent. Figure (18) plots the data. 
 
5. How far is the NHC sector from Dubai?  
 
Productivity is a relative measure. To assess Oman NHC sector’s performance we compare it to 
Dubai, which is largely a non-hydrocarbon economy. We use Dubai Statistics data from 2006 – 
2007 to 2015-2016; some variables have missing observations. Poor data notwithstanding, we 
compare TFP, labor productivity, capital deepening, human capital accumulation and foreign 
direct investment (FDI).  The data show that although Dubai’s productivity growth is negative 
too, it is still higher than Oman’s NHC sector. 
 
We report the sectoral output contributions in Oman NHC sector and Dubai for 2016.x Table (7) 
reports the economic activities in 2016 in both Oman’s NHC sector and Dubai. Note that 
services make up 70 percent of Dubai’s economy. Services productivity is hard to measure 
because output in services is hard to measure. Therefore, we remain cautious about comparing 
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Oman’s sector developments to Dubai. Oman’s non-hydrocarbon TFP is smaller than that of 
Dubai over the period from 2007 to 2015, and declining.  It is rather vital to understand why that 
is. Figure (19) plots the Omani TFP relative to Dubai’s (Dubai=100). 
 
5.1 Relative TFP Growth  
 
For Dubai, we computed the share of labor using total compensations to employee / nominal 
GDP to be 0.38, thus given the constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas production function, the 
share of capital is 0.62. The stock of capital is computed using exactly same method we used for 
Oman earlier. The depreciation rate is fixed at 0.05. Figure (20) plots the growth rate of TFP for 
Oman’s NHC sector and Dubai’s. Table (8) reports the averages and the standard deviations. 
TFP growth is negative on average in both places, which is not surprising; the Conference Board 
data also shows negative TFP growth for the UAE. However, Oman’s NHC sector has a 
significantly lower and more volatile average growth of TFP than Dubai.  Dubai’s TFP growth 
declined significantly in 2009 (the period of the Great Recession that followed the Global 
Financial Crisis), recovered, and then started to decline mildly 2014. The overall ‘assessment’ is 
that both economies run into significant inefficiencies, however, less in Dubai than Oman’s NHC 
sector.  
 
5.2 Relative Labor Productivity  
 
Similarly, Dubai’s real GDP per employed person growth rate – labor productivity growth – is 
also negative on average (-1.0) over the period from 2007, however, it is less negative than 
Oman’s NHC sector (-4.2). Figure (21) illustrates. Relative to Dubai, Oman NHC sectors’ labor 
productivity level has been constantly falling too.  Figure (22) plots relative labor productivity. 
So what are the sources of growth in Dubai?  Not Capital Deepening, the capital-output ratio 
growth rate is, on average, lower than Oman’s NHC sector. It grew at a negative rate of -1.25 
over the period from 2007 to 2015. Figure (23) plots the data. 
 
There are two remaining data pertinent to growth: human capital accumulation and foreign direct 
investments. Figures (24) and (25) plot the growth rate of primary & secondary school 
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enrollment and university & college enrollments. These are proxies for human capital. Both 
enrollment variables are significantly higher in Dubai.  Average primary and secondary school 
enrollment growth rate over the period from 2000 is 5.17 percent. Oman’s is 1.86 percent. 
Average university and college enrollment growth is double that of Oman, 14.5 percent 
compared with 7 percent in Oman.  
 
Figure (26) plots FDI growth rates for Dubai and Oman. Again, Dubai’s FDI growth rate is 
significantly higher than Oman. The average over the sample is 16.7 for Dubai and 14.1 in 
Oman. The difference is statistically significant.  
 
Estimation of the contribution to real GDP growth and the rate of return on these investments is 
hard given the small sample size. Given the significant difference in human capital accumulation 
and FDI in Dubai, we examine their effects on real GDP growth a little more. Figure (27) is a 
scatter plot of real GDP growth rate in Dubai along with three variables, the primary and 
secondary school enrollment growth rate; the university enrollment growth rate, both as proxy 
for human capital; and the FDI growth rate. There is no correlation. Dubai’s real GDP growth is 
uncorrelated with either human capital or FDI. We plot the same data for Oman in figure (28). 
Relatively, human capital proxy the school enrollment has higher correlation with real GDP 
growth, but not FDI. These correlations are generally weak. This is troubling. Razzak and 
Bentour (2013) provide evidence for the effects of FDI on economic growth in developing 
countries; see also Bin Jelili (2020).     
 
6. The Rate of Return on Investments  
 
To measure the rate of return on investments, we estimate a simple growth model. The 
dependent variable is real GDP per capita. The independent variables are private investments – 
output ratio (or per capita); government investments – output ratio (or per capita); the growth 
rate of the production of hydrocarbon (oil and gas in millions of oil barrels) per capita; and two 
proxy measures of human capital. These measures are enrollments in primary & secondary 
schools – per capita growth rate and college and university enrollments per capita growth rate.  
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We report the estimated elasticities in table (9). For the whole economy, the fit is very good as 
shown by 2R (0.81). Our estimates have consistent standard errors. Private investments and the 
production of hydrocarbon growth rates have very significant effect on productivity growth.  A 
10 percent increase in private investment to GDP ratio raises the growth rate of per capita 
income by 2.5 to 3 percent. This is quite significant relatively speaking. A 10 percent increase in 
the growth rate of hydrocarbon production per capita increases real GDP per capita growth by 6 
percent. It is not the case for the NHC sector. We showed earlier that there is evidence of 
independence between growth in the HC and NHC sectors. In this growth model, hydrocarbon 
per capita growth rate has no significant affect on real GDP per capita growth in the NHC sector. 
This result confirms the correlations we reported earlier in this paper. We concluded that the oil 
sector is independent of the NHC sector. Proxies for human capital have negative impact on real 
GDP per capita growth. Typical growth models have significant positive impact from human 
capital. This is not the case in Oman.  
 
To interpret our estimated rate of returns on investments, for example, the estimated elasticity be 
0.5, GDP is OR 6 and investment is OR 1. The rate of return is 0.5(6/1) is OR 3. Thus, a 100 
percent increase in investments from OR 1 to OR 2 increases GDP from OR 6 to OR 9, 
reflecting the estimated elasticity of ½ percent.   
 
Our results indicate that – everything else remained unchanged – a 10 percent increase in private 
investments – GDP ratio increases real GDP per capita growth by a quarter of a percentage point. 
Thus the rate of return on private investments is                  , where   is the estimated 
elasticity 0.03. In terms of the levels, for example, average real GDP over the period 1999-2016 
was OR 20,612 (million) and average private investments was OR 1,899 (million). Thus, the 
return is OR 0.33. Assume that investment is doubled from approximately OR 4,300 (million) in 
2016 to OR 8,600 (million). This would have increased average real GDP by approximately OR 
1.2 Billion from OR 29,067 (million) to OR 30,467 (million).  
 
Important to note that: (1) There is insignificant change in the results if we use private 
investments per capita and government investments per capita instead of private investments / 
GDP and government investment / GDP ratio. (2) The results are subject to a small sample bias. 
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(3) The effect of government investment / GDP on real GDP per capita growth is negative. Thus, 
the return on government investment is negative. Caveats are, first, our model has no dynamics 
because the sample is small. The effect on growth could take several years. Second, there is a 
strong positive relationship between government investments / GDP ratio and the level of real 
GDP per capita.xi  
 
7. Conclusions 
 
We have examined the performance of the Omani economy, with more attention paid to the 
NHC sector. Although Oman is a typical rentier economy, whereby oil fuels most activities, the 
data indicate that the Omani non-hydrocarbon sector is independent of the oil sector. The most 
serious issue is Oman’s low productivity.  The main causes of poor productivity are; first, the 
hydrocarbon reduces work-effort and incentives. When oil prices are high, government revenues 
are high, thus more government spending. Rent increases as a result. Razzak and Laabas (2016) 
reported that the estimated average weekly hours worked by person increases when the price of 
oil drops in the GCC. The explanation is that people smooth out consumption so they work 
harder – i.e., long hours, to keep income constant.   
 
Second, the labor market in the NHC sector is skewed towards unskilled labor. The labor market 
is segmented with a wage (and benefits) differential whereby most of the Omani skilled labor 
work in the public sector while most of the less skilled and unskilled labor is in the private NHC 
sector producing unskilled-intensive services.  
 
Within the labor market, wages, productivity, and employment are jointly determined. In a 
typical flexible labor market, firms continue to employ labor if the real wage is less than the 
marginal productivity of labor. They lay-off labor if the real wage exceeds labor productivity. 
Moreover, in equilibrium the real wage must be equal to labor productivity. On the supply of 
labor side, workers accept job offers when the real wage exceeds the reservation wage. The 
reservation wage depends on the benefits workers receive if they do not work. We do not know 
what the reservation wages are, but table (6) reports the distribution of skills across the 
government and the private sectors. We also know that total compensations to employees in the 
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government sector is OR 3,306,000,000 and the compensations for the private sector is OR 
7,031,000,000, therefore, government sector’s wage premium is OR 407. This premium is the 
ratio of the average wage in government sector / average in the private sector. The averages 
decline as the total number of workers increase. This premium suggests that the Omani people 
prefer government jobs. In addition, the worker receives more benefits; shorter average weekly 
hours worked, and job security, etc. Policy must focus on ways to eliminate this premium. One 
way to eliminate this premium is to reduce the number of unskilled expats in Oman; it would 
raise the average wage in the private sectors and reduce the public sector wage premium. 
Workers would be indifferent and equilibrium in the labor market is restored.  
 
Another way to eliminate the wage differential across sectors, i.e., public vs. private, in countries 
with income tax system is to alter the tax rate across sectors. For example, assume that the wage 
in the public sector is higher than the private sector for the same job, OR 8 vs. OR 6. Let’s 
suppose that the income tax rate 0.10, therefore the after-tax wages are OR 7.2 and OR 5.4. To 
make these two wages equal without any change in the wage itself, increase the tax rate in the 
public sector to 0.32. This will render wages equal at OR 5.4. Therefore, people would be 
indifferent to working in the public or the private sector.  
 
Policy reforms at both the firms and national level are needed to improve labor productivity in 
Oman. The main actions are listed in the Private Sector Growth Assessment study (World Bank, 
2016) and in the proposed Policy Reform Agenda prepared by the Macro Fiscal Unit at the 
Ministry of Finance (2017.) Both documents include reforms in the following key areas: 
investment climate, labor market, and education. After investing in much needed infrastructure 
projects, Omanis should allocate resources to investment projects with increasing return to scale.  
 
Increasing productivity is more than a structural issue. For example, Razzak et al. (2016) have 
shown that in advanced economies, factor input growth differentials (capital, labor) could not 
explain international productivity growth differential. Global research efforts and development 
(R&D) efforts seem to be a key determinant factor of TFP and can explain (in the long run) 80 
percent of the productivity growth differentials. Oman has to increases the quality of its labor 
force in order to attract more technology (i.e., the skill-biased technical change). Foreign 
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technical progress requires highly skilled workers in order to come to Oman. Again, policy has 
to focus on reducing the millions of unskilled foreign workers in Oman, attract more FDI,   
 
There are a couple of crucial areas for future productive development. First, education and the 
labor market are highly connected. In 2018, more than 23,000 people graduated with university 
degrees. They all looked for the government to find them jobs. The Five-Year plan also 
anticipates at least 20,000 jobs to be created annually. Currently, the government only thinks 
about how to achieve this objective. In fact, there should be “out-of-box” long-run solutions to 
this extraordinary problem. Not all ideas are welcome, but they should be heard and debated. 
 
Here, we propose a policy idea. We see the problem as an excess supply of labor. There are more 
job seekers than posted jobs. This is especially true in the public sector. More Omanis want to 
work in the government. The source of the excess supply is free tertiary education to all. 
Obviously, everyone likes free education. Some argue that free university is a right that every 
citizen should have. We argue that education should be free up to the end of high school. 
University education has a private return, which is higher than public returns. Therefore, it is 
probably unwise to use public money to provide university education to all people. That been 
said, public financing of university education depends on the stage of development. Countries, 
which are in the early stages of development, spend more on university education. There are 
caveats too. Some talented people have low income, which the state should pay for their 
university education. Usually, these people undergo asset testing.     
 
However, people have different abilities, i.e., heterogeneity. The fact is that only a small fraction 
of the 3000 students accepted at the Sultan Qaboos University can pass the entrance competence 
tests in Math and English, yet they all get accepted, graduate, and be looking for a job four or 
five years later. Similar issues arise in the vocational training institutions.  
 
Our idea is to link government subsidy to students (i.e., free tuition) and to tertiary institutions to 
the education’s outcomes. In other words, we propose to link subsidy to productivity of both the 
students and the universities and the vocational training institutions. Students who do not 
perform a certain Grade Point Average (GPA) should pay for their education. Universities that 
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cannot place its students in private sector jobs do not receive subsidies. In other words, make the 
student’s education subsidy correlated with the GPA, and taper it to zero as the GPA declines to 
below 1. Also, make the university’s subsidy correlated with its ability to place its graduates in 
private sector jobs.  This policy works on creating incentives to do well and to have better 
outcomes, higher productivity, and on eliminating excess supply of labor in the public jobs. We 
believe that this policy can save millions of OR in public spending. 
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Table (1) – Average Contribution to Real GDP 1998-2016 
Sector Contribution (%) 
Agriculture & Fishery 0.90 
Manufacturing 13.8 
Mining & Quarrying 0.30 
Electricity, Gas, & Water 4.80 
Building & Construction 4.20 
Services 34.8 
Wholesale & Retail Trade 7.40 
Hotels & Restaurants 0.80 
Transport, Storage & Communications 4.10 
Financial Intermediation 3.80 
Real Estate & Business Activities 4.20 
Public Administration & Defense 7.60 
Education 3.90 
Health 1.60 
Source: Ministry of Finance / National Center of Statistics and Information 
 
 
Table (2) - Average Shares in the Economy 
 1998-2005 2006-2016  
Hydrocarbon 61.9 44.3  
Non hydrocarbon 39.4 57.9  
The shares are GDP in constant basic prices in the sectors / economy’s real GDP 
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Table (3) - Descriptive Statistics for the Real Economy 
Real GDP Growth Rates 
 Average STD CV 
Economy 3.61 3.02 0.84 
Hydrocarbon 0.91 4.51 4.94 
Non hydrocarbon 6.80 3.49 0.51 
STD is the standard deviation CV is the coefficient of variation  
 
 
Table (4) - The Price Deflator Inflation Rate 1999-2016 
 
Average STD CV 
Economy 5.14 14.83 2.88 
Hydrocarbon 6.88 28.78 4.18 
Non Hydrocarbon 2.52 4.65 1.84 
STD is the standard deviation CV is the coefficient of variation 
 
 
Table (5) - TFP Growth Descriptive Statistics 1999-2016 
 Average STD CV 
Economy -2.19 2.61 -1.19 
Hydrocarbon -3.81 3.46 -0.91 
Non-Hydrocarbon -0.83 6.46 -7.78 
   STD is standard deviation. CV is coefficient of variation  
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Table (6) - The Distribution of Workers by Skills and Sectors 
  Government  Sector Private Sector 
  Expatriate Omani Total Expatriate Omani Total 
Not stated 236 126 362 23622 - 23,622 
Illiterate 6,979 2,196 9,175 30009 6,816 36,825 
Read and Write 2,422 9,625 12,047 508852 27,134 535,986 
Primary 28 7,851 7,879 162567 22,379 184,946 
Preparatory 48 10,086 10,134 649461 51,657 701,118 
Secondary 302 37,932 38,234 260034 82,144 342,178 
Total Unskilled 9,779 67,690 77,469 1,610,923 190,130 1,801,053 
Diploma 5,542 33,807 39,349 50566 19,449 70,015 
University 17,291 81,412 98,703 90116 22,602 112,718 
Higher Diploma 747 4,560 5,307 4682 62 4,744 
Master's Degree 3,026 7,164 10,190 5456 1,485 6,941 
Ph.D. 1,003 1,178 2,181 2614 141 2,755 
Total Skilled 27,609 128,121 155,730 153,434 43,739 197,173 
Grand Total 37,624 195,937 233,561 1,787,979 233,869 2,021,848 
NCSI Annual Statistical Bulletin 2017, PP 110 and 111. Not stated are not included in the totals. Caveat: some 
workers with low-qualification could be considered skilled since skills could be acquired from learning-by-doing. 
  
 
 
Table (7) – Sector Contribution to Total Output 2016 
 Oman Dubai 
Sector Contribution % Contribution % 
Agriculture & Fishery - 0.10 
Agriculture 0.96  
Fishery  0.64  
Manufacturing 9.13 9.50 
Mining & Quarrying 0.39 1.70 
Electricity & Water  2.01 - 
Electricity, Gas, Steam & AC - 2.60 
Total Industrial Activity 19.18 13.90 
Water& Sewage, Waste    0.10 
Building & Construction  7.64 6.20 
Services 41.20 70.20 
Wholesale & Retail Trade 7.39 26.9 
Hotels & Restaurants 0.92 4.90 
Transport, Storage & Communications 6.09 11.5 
Financial Intermediation 5.19 11.3 
Real Estate & Business Activities  4.22 6.80 
Public Administration & Defense 9.26 3.00 
Education 4.84 0.70 
Health 1.92 1.00 
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Table (8) - Summary Statistics for TFP Growth 
 Average STD 
Dubai -0.19 2.03 
Oman NHC Sector -4.02 5.15 
 
  
 
 
Table (9) – OLS 
Dependent Variable is Real GDP per capita Growth Rate Sample 1999-2016 
Economy Wide NHC Sector 
 Coefficients P value  Coefficient P value             0.025 0.0000  0.03 0.0040            -0.028 0.0000 -0.07 0.0000               0.60 0.0000  0.00 0.9696                -0.32 0.0000 -0.51 0.2016                 -0.04 0.0160 -0.18 0.1462            0.0078 -1.16 0.0000     0.81  0.35    0.01  0.03     2.41  1.32    is real GDP,     is working age population,    is private investments,    is government investments,   is total 
production of oil and gas measured in millions of barrels of oil-equivalent,   is enrollments, and the superscripts    
and   refer to primary & secondary and university. All variables are stationary. The standard error of the regression 
is   and    is the Durbin-Watson statistic. We use HAC standard errors and covariance estimation with pre-
whitening lag = 2, AIC max-lag=2, Bartlett Kernel with a Newey-West bandwidth 1.85 and 2 lags. The Bandwidth 
is small because the sample is small; hence, the small sample bias exists. Results do not change if we use          
and          as regressors.  
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i
 Oman investments law was enacted in 2019. 
 
ii
 The null hypothesis is that there is no association between the NHC and the HC sectors. With 17 degrees of 
freedom, the Chi-squared test value implies that we cannot reject the hypothesis. We also estimate Granger-
Causality type regressions. We found no feedback from the HC GDP and its growth rate. Past information on HC 
sector, do not explain current NHC GDP. 
 
iii
 The Conference Board statistics might be different but they are negative too. 
 
iv
 The production function is a constant return to scale Cobb-Douglas.   1KNLY , where Y is real GDP, L is 
labor measured by employment, N is the flow of hydrocarbon (oil and gas measured in same unites of million 
barrels), K is capital stock. We assume that hydrocarbon is a relevant input in the production function of every sector 
in the economy (Solow and Wan 1976 and Stiglitz 1974). The stock of capital is measured by the Perpetual 
Inventory method ttt IKK   )1(0  , where initial capital stock 1998tK is assumed to be three times real GDP; the 
average depreciation rate is 0.055 taken from Penn World tables 9.0 and investments tI is gross fixed capital 
formation. We deflate the stock of capital by the sector’s corresponding deflator. The flow of hydrocarbon is N (oil 
and gas in equivalent barrels). The share of labor is measured total compensations to employee / nominal GDP for 
the economy, HC and NHC sectors. The share of hydrocarbon is the oil revenues in OR / nominal GDP in the 
sectors respectively. We do not have data for gross operating surplus to calculate the share of capital and that is the 
reason for assuming Constant Returns to Scale such that the share of capital is 1 minus the other two shares. The 
share of labor in total output is 0.29 and oil is 0.25; for the HC sector the shares are 0.05 and 0.59 for labor and oil 
respectively (capital-intensive sector); and for NHC sector the shares are 0.46 and 0.44 for labor and oil 
respectively. These shares are averages of the period 1999 to 2016. The marginal productivity of labor is 
LYKNLMPLLY // 11     and the marginal product of capital is the derivative with respect capital 
stock. 
 
v
 TFP is a measure of technical progress or efficiency. In Solow (1956) – the neoclassical growth model – it is a 
residual.  Prescott (1998) argues that TFP needs an economic theory. In the original Solow growth model (Solow, 
1956), growth depends positively on savings, and negatively on population growth. Technological progress, which 
drives the growth process, was exogenous.  In the recent endogenous growth literature (see, Mankiw et. al1992, 
Romer 1990 and Lucas 1988 among many others) saving accumulation (capital) remains a crucial explanatory 
variable, however, technical progress, which is knowledge (measured by human capital, research and development, 
pure research ideas) is the main driver of growth in general. Put simply, growth is about producing and selling new 
goods and services. Both the variety and the quality of these goods and services are necessary for selling them in 
competitive markets. The new goods and services imbed workers’ skills and new research ideas (see Jones 2002, 
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Lucas 2009 and Lucas and Moll (20140 for example). For example, most of the value of the newer generations of 
cellphones compared to the older generations is in the ideas behind their new functions.  
Constant growth could, temporarily, continue at a faster rate if research intensity, which creates the new ideas, rises 
steadily over time. It is possible to think of two constant growth paths. At a balanced growth path is where all 
variables in the economy grow at constant exponential rates forever. This growth rate is associated with the long-run 
steady state. Another constant growth path is associated with the transitional dynamics. This path is a function of 
capital deepening, human capital, labor, and excess ideas.  
 
vi
 TFP is  1/ KNLY , where Y is real GDP, L is labor measured by employment, N is flow of hydrocarbon (oil 
and gas measured in same unites of million barrels), K is capital stock.  
 
vii
 Oman is the only Arab country that is not included in the Barro-Lee data set on average years of schooling 
because the data are not available, thus the Penn World table does not report human capital index for Oman. 
 
viii
 Nelson and Phelps (1966) is an early contribution to the effect of investments in human capital on growth. 
 
ix
 NCSI Monthly Statistical Bulletin 2018 reports that imports of capital equipment was 20 percent of total imports 
in 2016. 
 
x
 Only 2016 data are available. 
 
xi
 Wes estimated the same model in levels using Fully-Modified OLS (FM-OLS) method. This estimation is 
restricted by the shortness of the sample. We could not have lags because of the short sample, except for one lag in 
the cointegration relationship. We use the Newey-West method with no lags to adjust the standard errors.   
